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Abstract
We consider a supply channel composed of one manufacturer and two
retailers. Three cases are studied. The non-cooperative one is a leader-
follower relationship. The manufacturer determines his spending in na-
tional advertising and the whole sale price. Then, the retailers determine
non-cooperatively the price for consumers. The second case is a partial-
cooperative one where retailers decide jointly for the price. In the third
case, all members of the channel cooperate by maximizing a joint prot
function. The spending in advertising and the quantity sold are the lowest
in the partial-cooperative case, while retailersprice is the highest. Inter-
estingly, when the degree of substituability between the two products pro-
posed by retailers is low, these latter are worse o¤with partial-cooperation
with respect to non-cooperation. Partial-cooperation is always the worst
case for the manufacturer, the whole channel, consumerssurplus and so-
cial welfare, while cooperation is the best case. Cooperating members can
share the extra-prot by a whole sale price.
Keywords: Game theory; Manufacturer-two-retailers; National ad-
vertising; Cooperation.
1 Introduction
Supply chain management research has gained a considerable attention from
both the academics and the practitioners. The supply chain is generally concep-
tualized as a network of interconnected businesses that produce raw materials,
change these materials into intermediate goods and then nished products, dis-
tribute and sale the products to the targeted consumers. One interesting issue
in this area is how the actions taken by one member of the chain can inuence
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the protability of other members. The supply chain implies an important re-
lationship between its di¤erent members as manufacturers and retailers. This
relationship can be non-cooperative or cooperative. In the non-cooperative sit-
uation, each member of the supply chain has his own objective function; the
members who act rst, as manufacturers, are leaders, while those who react,
as retailers, are followers. In a cooperative situation, the chain members work
together for the same goal.
Many studies on advertising e¤orts and pricing policy have focused on dis-
tribution channels formed by one manufacturer and one retailer. Karray and
Zaccour (2006) proposed a model to study the decision of a private label intro-
duction for a retailer and its e¤ects on the manufacturer. They showed that
the private label introduction improves both the prot of the retailer and of
the channel although it could harm the manufacturers prot. Nevertheless,
under some conditions, the manufacturer could prot from the private label
introduction. Yue et al. (2006) studied the coordination of cooperative adver-
tisement in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain when the manufacturer o¤ers
price deductions to consumers. They showed that for any given price deduction,
the total prot for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher
than without cooperation. Xie and Wei (2009) addressed channel coordination
by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing
in a manufacturer-retailer distribution channel. They compared two models: a
non-cooperative, leaderfollower game and a cooperative game. They showed
that cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher chan-
nel total prot than the non-cooperative one, lower retailer price to consumers,
and the advertising e¤orts are higher for all channel members. They identied
the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can
determine how to divide the extra-prots generated by cooperation.
Other papers have been interested by a one manufacturer-two retailers dis-
tribution channel without advertising. Cachon and Lariviere (2005) studied
revenue-sharing contracts in a general supply chain model with revenues de-
termined by each retailers purchase quantity and price. Yang and Zhou (2006)
considered the pricing and quantity decisions of a two-echelon system with a
manufacturer who supplies a single product to two competitive retailers. They
analyzed the e¤ects of the duopolistic retailersdi¤erent competitive behaviors
(Cournot, Collusion and Stackelberg) on the optimal decisions of the manu-
facturer and the retailers. Xiao and Qi (2008) considered the coordination of
a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers after the
production cost of the manufacturer was disrupted. They considered two coor-
dination mechanisms: an all-unit quantity discount and an incremental quantity
discount. For each mechanism, they developed the conditions under which the
supply chain is coordinated and discussed how the cost disruption may a¤ect
the coordination mechanisms.
Karray and Zaccour (2007) considered a distribution channel formed by two
manufacturers and two retailers to investigate whether cooperative advertising
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programs are protable for such channels. They showed that, under some con-
ditions, cooperative advertising may be protable for retailers and the whole
channel, and may not be protable for manufacturers. However, their model is
limited to local advertising with no national advertising, and full cooperation
between the retailers or between all channel members are not studied.
Our research is closely related to the one of Xie and Wei (2009). We made
some simplications to their model by considering that there are no retailerslo-
cal advertising expenditures and no manufacturers participation rate. However,
we enrich their model by considering two competing retailers. This extension
enables us to study the case of cooperation between the retailers. In addition, we
evaluate the impact of cooperation between retailers and between all members
of the supply chain on consumers surplus and social welfare. Such comparisons
are interesting and have not been done before by previous studies on supply
chain.
we consider a supply channel game model with a single manufacturer and
two retailers. The manufacturer sells a product with a whole sale price to the
retailers, which sell the product purchased to nal consumers. Without loss
of generality, we suppose that production and handling costs are zero. The
manufacturer uses national advertising to increase consumers interest in the
product. Consumers demand for the product depends on its price and on
the advertisement e¤ort made. The manufacturer determines its whole sale
price and national advertising spending. Then, the retailers determine the price
for consumers. We consider and compare three cases. The non-cooperative
case, where the manufacturer and the retailers decide non-cooperatively, and
each of them maximizes its own prot. The partially-cooperative, where only
the two retailers cooperate by maximizing a joint prot function. Finally, in
the cooperative case, the three members of the supply channel engage in a
cooperative program and maximize the whole prot of the supply chanel. We
note that for the rst two cases, the manufacturer is the leader while the retailers
are the followers. This game is solved backward to obtain a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
We show that when only retailers cooperate, the price for consumers is the
highest, while the quantity produced and the spending in advertising are the
lowest with respect to non-cooperation and cooperation. Interestingly, when
the degree of substituability between the goods proposed by retailers is not
important, cooperation between retailers is harmful for them. Moreover, coop-
eration between retailers reduces the prot of the manufacturer and of all the
chain.. Consequently, consumerssurplus and social welfare are higher with non-
cooperation than with partial-cooperation between rms. When all members of
the supply channel cooperate, the price for consumers is the lowest, the spend-
ing in advertising, production, total prot of the supply channel, consumers
surplus and social welfare are the highest. The manufacturer and retailers can
determine a whole sale price enabling them to share this extra-prot due to co-
operation. When this cooperative whole sale price is at its lower bound, all the
extra-prot goes to the retailers; when it is at its higher bound, all the extra-
prot goes to the manufacturer; and when it is in the middle, the extra-prot
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is equally shared by the manufacturer and the two retailers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic game-
theoretic model. Section 3 solves the non-cooperative case. Section 4 solves
the partially-cooperative case. Section 5 solves the cooperative game. Section
6 studies the extra-prot sharing. Section 7 discusses and compares the three
cases studied, and Section 8 concludes.
2 The basic model
We consider a manufacturer-two-retailers distribution channel in which both
retailers sell only the manufacturers brand within the product class. Decision
variables for the manufacturer are the national advertising expenditure A and
the whole sale price to retailers w. The decision variables for the retailers are
their retail prices pi; i = 1; 2:For tractability reasons, we suppose that there are
no local advertising expenditures for retailers. The game is a leader-follower
one: the manufacturer chooses his decision variables, then the retailers choose
their retail prices. This game is solved backward to get a subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium.
The manufacturer uses brand advertising to increase consumersinterest and
demand for the good produced. Consumersdemand Vi for the good proposed
by retailer i, also known as the sale response function, depends on the retail
prices and the advertising level as
Vi(pi; pj ; A) = gi(pi; pj)h(A); i = 1; 2; j = 3  i (1)
where gi(pi; pj) and h(A) reect the impact of the retail prices and the brand
advertising expenditures on the demand of product i; respectively.
As many studies (Xiao and Qi (2008)), we assume that the demand function
for product i is linear with retail prices:1
gi(pi; pj) = 1  pi + pj ; 0 <  < 1; i = 1; 2; j = 3  i (2)
where  is the degree of substituability between the two products proposed
by retailers. The maximum value for gi(pi; pj) is normalized to 1 for simplicity
of the expressions.
The impact of national advertising expenditures on the demand of product i
is an increasing and concave function consistent with the advertising saturation
e¤ect:2
h(A) =
p
A (3)
1Using a more general and linear demand function as gi(pi; pj) = a pi+pj ; 0 < a; 0 <
 < ; does not change our analytical results.
2We can use a more general function h(A) = l
p
A; l > 0; but this has no e¤ect on our
analytical results.
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Therefore, we have:
Vi(pi; pj ; A) = (1  pi + pj)
p
A; i = 1; 2; j = 3  i (4)
We suppose that the manufacturers unit production cost and the retailers
unit handling cost are constants. We normalize them to zero to simplify our
expressions.
The prots of the manufacturer, each retailer, the two retailers, and the
whole system are, respectively:
m = w(V1 + V2) A (5)
ri = (pi   w)Vi (6)
r1+r2 = (p1   w)V1 + (p2   w)V2 (7)
t = m +r1 +r2 = p1V1 + p2V2  A (8)
One of the most contribution of this paper is the evaluation of the impact
of both cooperation between retailers and between all members on consumers
surplus and social welfare.
The consumers surplus engendered by the consumption of quantity Vi of
the product sailed by retailer i is:
CS(Vi) =
Z Vi
0
pi(t)dt  piVi (9)
From (4), we have:
pi(Vi) = 1 + pj   Vip
A
; i = 1; 2; j = 3  i (10)
Using (10) in (9), we get:
CS(Vi) =
V 2i
2
p
A
(11)
The total consumers surplus engendered by the consumption of the two
products is:
CSt = CS(V1) + CS(V2) (12)
We dene the social welfare as the total consumerssurplus plus the total
prot of the supply chain:
S = CSt +t (13)
In what follows, we will solve backward the three games.
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3 The non-cooperative game
The three members of the supply channel behave non-cooperatively. It is a two-
stage game. In the rst stage, the manufacturer (leader) maximizes his prot
with respect to its decision variables, which are w and A. Then, each retailer
(follower) maximizes his prot function with respect to the price he proposes
for consumers.
Solving the second-stage rst-order conditions, which are @ri@pi = 0; i =
1; 2;gives the retail prices, which are symmetric:
pi = p
 =
1 + w

(14)
where  = 2  . We can verify that 1 <  < 2:
Using the expression given by (14) in (5), we get:
m =
2

w(1  w)
p
A A (15)
Using (15)and solving the rst-stage rst-order conditions3 for the manufac-
turer, which are @

m
@w = 0 and
@m
@A = 0 ;we get the optimal whole sale price
and advertising spending:
w =
1
2
(16)
A =
1
1622
(17)
where  = 1  ; veries 0 <  < 1=2:
Using w = 12 in the other expressions, we get the optimal values for the
non-cooperative case of the other variables, which are given in Table 1. It is
easy to verify that the whole sale price is lower than the retailersprice. Also,
we can verify that m > 2

r , meaning that the manufacturer gains more than
the two retailers together.
4 The partially-cooperative game
In this section, the retailers decide to cooperate by maximizing their joint prot
function, while the manufacturer still maximizes his own prot function. This
is a two-stage game where the manufacturer plays rst (leader) and the retailers
play second (followers).
3Second-order conditions are veried because @
2m
@w2
< 0;
@2m
@A2
< 0 and @
2m
@w@A
= 0:
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Solving the second-stage rst-order conditions,4 which are @r1+r2@pi = 0; i =
1; 2;gives the retail prices, which are symmetric:
pi = p =
1 + w
2
(18)
Using the expression given by (18) in (5), we get:
m = w(1  w)
p
A A (19)
Using (19)and solving the rst-stage rst-order conditions5 for the manufac-
turer, which are @
m
@w = 0 and
@ m
@A = 0 ;we get the optimal whole sale price
and advertising spending:
w =
1
2
(20)
A =
1
642
(21)
Using the optimal values of the decision variables, we get the optimal values
for the partially-cooperative case of the other variables which are given in Table
1.
We can verify that the whole sale price is lower than the retail price. It
is easy to verify that m = 2r:Contrary to the non-cooperative case, when
retailers cooperate, their joint gain is equal to that of the manufacturer.
5 The cooperative game
In this last case studied, the manufacturer and retailers agree to make decisions
that maximize the total supply channel prot. Then, they negotiate how they
will share the extra-prot engendered by such cooperation.
The total prot function of the system given by (8) can be written as:
t =
 
p1 + p2   p21   p22 + 2p1p2
p
A A (22)
4Second-order conditions are veried because

@2r1+r2
@p21
@2r1+r2
@p1@p2
@2r1+r2
@p1@p2
@2r1+r2
@p22
 =  2pA 2pA2pA  2pA
 > 0
5Second-order conditions are veried because @
2 m
@w2
=  2
p
A < 0; @
2 m
@A2
=   w
8 A3=2
< 0
and @
2 m
@w@A
= 0:
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The whole prot of the system depends only on p1; p2 and A:The three rst-
order conditions6 of optimality are @t@p1 = 0;
@t
@p2
= 0 and @t@A = 0; which give
us the unique symmetric cooperative solution:
pci = p
c =
1
2
(23)
Ac =
1
162
(24)
In Table 1 we give the cooperative values of the remaining expressions by
using the optimal values of the decision variables.
Table1
Comparison of the results for the three cases7
Non-cooperation Partial-cooperation Cooperation Comparisons
w = 12 w =
1
2
1+2
42
< wc < 
3 
23
wc < w = w
p = +2 p =
3
4 p
c = 12 p
c < p < p
V  = 1
82
V = 132 V
c = 18
V < V  < V c
A = 1
1622
A = 1
642
Ac = 1
162
A < A < Ac
r =
1
163
r =
1
1282
cr =
1 2wc
162
r < 

r ,  < 3 
p
5
m =
1
1622
m =
1
642
cm =
4wc 1
162
m < 

m
t =
2+
1623
t =
1
322
ct =
1
162
t < 

t < 
c
t
CSt =
1
163
CSt =
1
128 CS
c
t =
1
16 CSt < CS
 < CSct
S = 3+
1623
S = 4+
1282
Sct =

162
S < S < Sct
6 Extra-prot sharing
To commit to a cooperative program, the prots of the manufacturer and retail-
ers through cooperation should be higher than their own prots realized in the
non-cooperative Stackelberg game. We need a bargaining mechanism to moti-
vate the channel members to cooperate and to share the extra-prot engendered
by cooperation, which is:
t = 
c
t  t > 0 (25)
6Second-order conditions are veried by using the following partial derivatives: @
2t
@p21
=
@2t
@p22
=  2pA; @2t
@p1@p2
= 2
p
A; @
2t
@A@p1
= @
2t
@A@p2
= 0; @
2t
@A2
=  1
8A3=2
7Almost all the comparisons are easy to establish. We present some of them: i) r < r ,
2   6 + 4 =
h
   (3 p5)
i h
   (3 +p5)
i
> 0,  < 3 p5:
ii) t < t , 6(1  ) + 2 > 0 : which is true.
iii)t < ct , 62   3   9 + 4 = 4(1  )2(1  4 ) > 0 : which is evident.
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To share this extra-prot due to cooperation, the members of the channel
can set a whole sale price wc for each unit of product purchased by the retailers
from the manufacturer.
Using expression (5) with production and advertising spending equal to V c
and Ac, respectively, the prot of the manufacturer under cooperation is:
cm =
4wc   1
162
(26)
The manufacturer will participate to cooperation i¤
cm > 

m , wc > wcmax =
1 + 2
42
(27)
Thus, if the whole sale price is higher than wcmax; the manufacturer nds
cooperation interesting.
Using expression (6) with retail prices and expenditures in advertising equal
to pc and V c, respectively, the prot of each retailer under cooperation is:
cr =
1  2wc
162
(28)
Non-cooperating retailers will participate to the cooperative game i¤
cr > 

r , wc < wcmin =
3   
23
(29)
Therefore, when the whole sale price does not exceed a certain value wcmin, it
is in the interest of non-cooperating retailers to cooperate with the whole supply
chain. Thus, we can establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1 To get all partners interested by cooperation, the whole sale
price should be between a minimal value and a maximal value
wcmin < w
c < wcmax (30)
We can easily verify that wcmin < w
c
max and that when inequality (30) is
veried, then wc < pc:
A whole sale price near wcmin gives a higher share of the extra-prot to the
retailers, and when it is near wcmax; it gives a higher share to the manufacturer.
When wc = wcmin, all the exta-prot goes to the retailers: the manufacturer
is indi¤erent between cooperating or not. When wc = wcmax;all the exta-prot
goes to the manufacturer: the retailers are indi¤erent between cooperation and
non-cooperation.
Proposition 2 The whole sale price that split equally the extra-prot between
the manufacturer and the two retailers is
wce =
wcmin + w
c
max
2
(31)
Indeed, with wc = wce;we have
t
2 = 
c
m  m:
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7 Comparison of results and discussions
From the comparisons presented in Table 1, we have the following propositions.
Proposition 3 (i) wc < w = w;(ii) pc < p < p;(iii) V < V  < V c; (iv)
A < A < Ac:
The above proposition shows that the whole sale price does not depend on
whether retailers cooperate or not. Moreover, the whole sale price of cooper-
ation, which is determined to share the extra-prot, is the lowest because the
retail price is the lowest with respect to those of non-cooperation or partial-
cooperation. With partial-cooperation, the retail price is the highest, whereas
the quantity purchased and the spending in advertising are the lowest. How-
ever, with cooperation, the retail price is the lowest, the quantity purchased
and the spending in advertising are the highest. The fact that the expenditures
in advertising are the lowest under partial-cooperation is a new and interesting
result, which hasnt been studied by Xie and Wei (2009) as they considered
only one retailer. We can expect that the best situation for consumers is co-
operation of all members of the channel, and the worst situation for them is
partial-cooperation between retailers.
Proposition 4 (i) r < r ,  < 3 
p
5;(ii) m < m; (iii) t < 

t < 
c
t :
When the degree of substituability between the two products is su¢ ciently
low, cooperating retailers gain less than with non-cooperation. This result is
interesting and even surprising because usually rms are better o¤ when they
cooperate. This result is due to the spending in national advertising. Indeed,
when retailers unilaterally cooperate, the manufacturer feels threatened and
reduces his advertising spending while keeping the same whole sale price, leading
to an important reduction in sales and to a diminution of his own prot and
those of retailers. With the present model, we can easily show that, when there
is no advertising, the retailers are always better o¤ under partial-cooperation.
When the degree of substituability between the two products is su¢ ciently high,
we have the standard result that partial-cooperation of retailers increases their
prot with respect to non-cooperation. When retailers cooperate, the prot
of the manufacturer decreases because there is no change in the whole sale
price and the quantities sold are decreased. Consequently, the total prot of
the supply channel is the lowest with partial-cooperation and the highest with
cooperation.
Proposition 5 (i) CSt < CSt < CS
c
t ; (ii) S < S
 < Sc:
It is clear that the worst situation for consumers and the society is the
partial-cooperative case, and the better one is the cooperative case.
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8 Conclusion
Our paper extends the growing literature on supply channel by analyzing pricing
and advertising strategies for a supply channel consisting of one manufacturer
and two retailers.
The manufacturer produces one product that he sells to two retailers. The
retailers sell only the manufacturers product to consumers. The manufacturer
decides on the wholesale price and uses brand advertising to attract consumers
and to increase the overall demand as a result. The retailers, on the other hand,
decide on the retail prices. Consumersdemand depends on the retail prices of
the two retailers and on the manufacturers advertising spending.
First, we model the decision process as a non-cooperative game in which
the manufacturer is leader and the retailers are followers. The manufacturer
chooses the spending in national advertising and the whole sale price, then
each retailer chooses its price to consumers. Then, we consider the same model
but we assume that both retailers work together to maximize their joint prot
(partial-cooperative case). Finally, we adopt a cooperative game in which all
members of the supply channel maximize the total channel prot.
We show that the whole sale price does not depend on whether retailers co-
operate or not. With partial-cooperation, the retail price is the highest, whereas
the quantity purchased and the expenditures in advertising are the lowest. The
fact that the expenditures in advertising is the lowest under partial-cooperation
is a new and interesting result.
When the degree of substituability between the two products is su¢ ciently
low, cooperating retailers gain less than with non-cooperation. This result is
interesting and even surprising because usually rms are better o¤ when they
cooperate. This result is due to the spending in national advertising. Indeed,
when retailers unilaterally cooperate, the manufacturer feels threatened and re-
duces his advertising spending while keeping the same whole sale price, leading
to an important reduction in sales and to a diminution of his own prot and
those of retailers. With the present model, we can easily show that when there
is no advertising spending, the retailers are always better when they cooper-
ate. When the degree of substituability between the two products is su¢ ciently
high, we have the standard result that partial-cooperation of retailers increases
their prots with respect to non-cooperation. In addition, cooperation between
retailers decreases the prot of the manufacturer because there is no change in
the whole sale price and the quantities sailed are diminished. As a result, the
total prot of the supply channel is the lowest with partial-cooperation and the
highest with cooperation.
The worst situation for consumers and the society is the partial-cooperative
case, and the better one is the cooperative one. Cooperating partners can share
the extra-prot by setting a whole sale price which is lower than the one of non-
cooperation or partial-cooperation. There exists a whole sale price that splits
the extra-prot equally between the manufacturer and the two retailers.
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Finally, this model can be extended by considering that retailers spend in
local advertising, and that the manufacturer pays a fraction of this local adver-
tising cost.
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